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Abstract
Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is an evolving subset of MANET. It’s deployed on the
roads, where vehicles act as mobile nodes. Active security and Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) are integral applications of VANET, which require stable and uninterrupted
vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology. VANET, is a type of wireless network, due to
which it is quite prone to security attacks. Extremely dynamic connections, sensitive data
sharing and time-sensitivity of this network make it a vulnerable to security attacks. The
messages shared between the vehicles are the basic safety message (BSM), these messages
are broadcasted by each vehicle in the network to report its status to the other vehicles
and Road Side Unit (RSU). One common attack is to use position falsification to hamper
the roadside safety, leading to road accidents and congestion. Identifying malicious nodes
involved in such attacks is crucial to ensure safety in the network. The proposed research
presents a neural network based approach for detecting position falsification attacks in
VANET.
The proposed Deep Learning-based detection of attackers is done using the dataset
called Vehicular Reference Misbehavior Dataset (VeReMi). VeReMi dataset provides five
classes of attackers, each broadcasting fabricated coordinates concerning the type. This
MLP-based model uses resampled single BSM and two consecutive BSM to detect these
attacks.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Over the past couple of decades, communication techniques have transformed the automobile industry by providing instant communication among different devices. This effortless
exchange of data on a real-time basis has become a new paradigm of the industry. The
advancement in information technology and communication has made the idea of communication between mobile devices possible. Among these advancements, the concept of Ad
hoc networks came into the limelight. Ad hoc networks are a combined set of interconnected devices that can communicate with one another. However, the feature that makes
an ad hoc network unique is its property of decentralization. Rather than depending on
devices such as routers or data points to generate a predefined structure for communication,
each host present in the network acts as a router or access point itself and communicates
directly with the other hosts. Ad hoc networks are highly advantageous when the network
is highly mobile, with hosts coming and frequently going, such as in mobile ad hoc networks
(MANET) [34].
A Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) [11] is a variation of MANET. VANET refers
to a type of network created in an ad-hoc manner where each of the moving vehicles and
other connecting devices present in the range communicates over a wireless medium and
exchange helpful information to one another

1
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VANETs function on the idea of vehicles communicating directly with one another. The
type of communication thus being seen is Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication (V2V). However, specific extensions to the basic setup of the V2V structure, which indulge the need
for road infrastructure to communicate to vehicles, called Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communication, allow vehicles to communicate with road infrastructures such as overpasses
or road-side signs. Dedicated Short-Range Communication is one of the prime technologies
used in the VANET, especially in the V2V and V2I types of communications. In the United
States of America, Federal Communication Commission has allocated a licensed spectrum of
75MHz in a 5.9GHz frequency bandwidth for dedicated short-range communication (DSRC)
[33]. DSRC can be understood as “a two-way short- to medium-range wireless communications capability that allows quite high data communication, which is quite critical in
communications-based active safety applications.” Essentially, DSRC is a fast Wi-Fi with
little overhead to allow fast enough communication for VANET usage. 802.11p, a wireless protocol standardized for wireless access in vehicular environments (WAVE), works per
DSRC. On a vehicle, we call this an On-Board Unit (OBU), and on infrastructure, we call
this a Road-Side Unit (RSU).

1.2

Motivation

Why there is a need for vehicles to communicate with one another? The reason can be seen
for this, many of which involve safety or accident prevention. According to the “Vehicle
Safety Communications (VSC) consortium identified eight severe applications: traffic signal
violation warning, curve speed warning, emergency electronic brake light, pre-crash sensing,
cooperative forward collision warning, left turn assistant, lane- change warning, and stop
sign movement assistant.” However, not being able to receive the genuine Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) can potentially lead to accidents and loss of life. The Basic Safety message
can be understood as its name suggests the information transferred from one vehicle to another vehicle in the VANET network. The BSM consists of the safety messages that include
the vehicle position, speed acceleration, heading and other relevant status information. The
BSM messages are further explained in the section. Security and privacy are the two vital elements of any network. These are the primary needs of network communication, as
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compromising these can lead to severe outcomes. In a wireless network, breach of security
and privacy is common, and it gives the attacker an advantage to compromise the system.
In the field of VANET especially, there is a dire need for security and privacy as breaching
those on the road network can lead to significant consequences.

1.3

Problem Statement

In an ideal world, every BSM sent would be from a simple transmitter and received by
the genuine receiver. Unfortunately, in VANETs, due to the communication being wireless,
many attackers want to compromise the security of the communication. The resultant
alteration of the communication can majorly lead to severe congestion on the road and also
accidents. In the field of VANET, there are many types of attacks such as Dos, replay,
message alteration that can lead to severe accidents. Some of the attacks thus want to
compromise Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Among these attacks, there is also
one more attack that targets the Integrity of the vehicles. This is the position falsification
attack. In this particular type of threat, the attacker tries to send the wrong position [14]
of the vehicle and thus can mislead the honest vehicle. This is one of the most commonly
occurring types of attack seen in the VANET. The main focus of the research is to correctly
identify in the VANET network when a BSM is being sent to the receiver, whether that
BSM is from an actual vehicle or the attacker vehicle. In this thesis, a “genuine” vehicle
[9] is one that sends valid BSMs and does not alter its contents in any way. Conversely,
an “attacker” vehicle is engaged in a location spoofing attack by inserting false position
coordinates in the BSM [17].

1.4

Solution Outline

Location spoofing attacks in BSMs compromise the safety of vehicles and passengers. So,
a system needs to determine if a receiving BSM contains accurate information or is sent
from an attacker’s vehicle with false information. In this thesis, we are proposing a deep
learning model-based approach to detect position falsification attacks. The main idea is to
automatically recognize which messages are from genuine vehicles and attacker vehicles. The
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proposed solution consists of two major stages: the primary stage is the dataset preparation,
followed by the secondary stage of classification based on the knowledge gathered by the
BSMs. The data extracted from the one ground truth file and multiple vehicle log files are
pre-processed, and single and two consecutive BSM datasets are generated. This dataset
trains the machine learning and deep learning algorithms to classify the vehicles as genuine
or attackers.

1.5

Thesis Organization

After this chapter, the remaining portions of this thesis will be organized in the following
manner. Chapter 2 will provide a brief sketch of VANET communication and a literature
review of previous work done in detecting position falsification attacks. Chapter 3 will
discuss the proposed Neural Network based approach in detail and how it differs from the
existing approaches. Chapter 4 will discuss the simulation parameters, dataset, and the
proposed approach’s performance, including a comparison with existing schemes. Finally,
chapter 5 will discuss the conclusions of the work completed and directions for future work.

Chapter 2

Background Review
2.1

Overview of VANET

Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANET) [1] is a subset of wireless mobile ad hoc networks.
It is an ad-hoc network where each node acts as an independent and self-organized entity.
In VANET, various communication protocols have been proposed and used. The VANET
routing protocol can be identified into two categories: topology-based routing protocols and
Position-based routing protocols. The topology-based routing protocols use links knowledge
to transmit the packets of data between the nodes using the VANET. The primary two
subcategories under this type of mechanism are the proactive approach, which primarily
depends on the type of routing techniques related to table-driven methodology and the
reactive approach, which majorly depends on the type of routing techniques that are related to on-demand methodology. Position-based routing protocols use algorithms related
to the positioning mechanism using location-based applications (For example, GPS) With
the increase in the number of vehicles being equipped with smart technologies and wireless interact devices, inter-vehicle communication is becoming a primary field of research,
regularity, and advancement. VANETs promises a wide variety of applications, such as
restriction of blind crossing collisions, dynamic route scheduling, safety, real-time traffic
condition monitoring, etc. The most straightforward route choice and assignment method
is All-or-Nothing assignment (AON). This particular method takes that there are no present
congestion effects that are being considered by the drivers for the same attributes for route
5
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choice and perceive the same way. AON for VANETs is providing Internet connectivity to
vehicular nodes.

2.2

VANET Communication

Each vehicle in the network is equipped with an On-board Unit (OBU), with the necessary
computation and communication resources to facilitate communication with the nearby vehicles and other nodes. In addition to vehicles, the VANET environment includes Central
Authorities (CAs), Roadside units (RSUs), and other devices like smartphones. The roadside units allow vehicles to disseminate messages present in their range and act as a point
of access in the road network.

Figure 2.1: Types of Communication in VANET [28]

There are four different types of communication in VANET as shown in Fig 2.1
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1) Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V): In this type of communication, the information is being
shared using the OBU’s present on the vehicles, which helps the vehicles to communicate
with one another. [4]
2) Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I): In this type of communication, the OBUs present
on the vehicles interact with the RSUs available as the Road-Side and update the information of the vehicle. [4]
3) Infrastructure-to-Infrastructure (I2I): Infrastructures also communicate with each
other to provide backend support to the network
4) Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X): In this, the vehicles communicate with any interconnected device such as mobile phones.

2.2.1

Security Requirements

VANET offers facilities and services over the wireless channel and can be quite prone to
attacks [18]. To ensure reliable communication, specific security requirements [24] must be
met, as discussed below.
1) Authentication: Authentication is the process of verifying whether someone (or
something) is who (or what) it is declared to be. Authentication gives access control available for systems by ensuring that a user’s credentials match the credentials present in a
database of authorized users. Authentication is nothing but the process to verify that the
information sent in the form of messages is legitimate. To have a safe network, the sender
and receiver should be a part of the network. To maintain the legitimacy of the network,
information sent and received must be authenticated. Types of authentication attacks are
Message Tampering, Replay attack and Sybil attack. A message tampering attack is the
type of attack which alters the information present in the message. In replay attack the
attacker sends the same message but with different time stamps. In the Sybil attack, the
attacker generates many ghost vehicles in the network and mislead the legitimate vehicle.

2) Integrity: This is designed to protect data from deletion or modification by any unauthorized party. The information (Knowledge or data) transmitted to the receiver from the
transmitter must not be altered or manipulated before reaching the receiver. The message
exchange between the sender and the receiver must not be tampered with by the attacker.

Chapter 2. Background Review

8

The main motive of this type of attack is that the attacker tries to send malicious information to corrupt the network. The types of integrity attacks are Timing attacks, Message
alteration, Position Falsification Attacks and Message detection. The timing attack is the
type of attack in which the attacker tries to delay the legitimate message. The message
alteration and detection type of attack are when the attacker either inserts the false information or erases the simple message. The information altered can be the speed of the
vehicle, break status, and where’s the vehicle headed.

3)Availability: It can be defined as the availability of your data. Authentication helps
channels and systems to work correctly for the data they conceal and make sure that it is
ready to use when it is required.
High availability (HA) systems are computing resources with pretty large infrastructures designed to enhance availability. The type of HA system is what targets hardware
failures or power outages to enhance availability, or it may manage several types of network
connections to route around various network outages. A good network can be defined as
one which is always available and provides service without any interruption. Any attack on
the availability of the network prevents the genuine user from accessing the network. The
types of attacks seen in the availability are DOS, DDOS, Malware and spamming. Denial of
Service (DOS) is the type of attack in which the attacker tries to make the network unavailable for genuine users. Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) is the type of attack i which
a malicious attempt is made to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service or
network by overwhelming the target with a flood of Internet traffic. In the Malware attack,
the attacker tries to insert the malware in the message to compromise the availability of
the network. In the spamming attack, the attacker tries to send spam messages in the form
of original messages, which make the network unavailable for legitimate users.

4) Confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to an organization’s efforts to keep its data
private or secret. In actual life practice, the foremost thing is about allowing access to
data and preventing unauthorized access. This mainly involves making sure that only those
authorized by the specific domain have access to desired assets and that those who are not
authorized are actively prohibited from gaining access. In this type of attack, the attacker
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tries to compromise the confidentiality of the message by listening to the legitimate message.
The type of attack seen in the confidentiality is Eavesdropping. In the eavesdropping attack, the attacker tries to listen to the message sent by the genuine user to the receiver user.

Some of the common security attacks in VANET and the security requirements that
they violate are shown in Fig. 2.2.

Figure 2.2: VANET attacks and threats

2.2.2

Types of Attackers

Wireless networks are prone to malicious attacks from attackers having different motives.
An attacker can be understood as the entity whose primary aim is to alter the running
network by affecting the infrastructure in any way possible. An attacker can create problems
in the established network by gaining full access to the communication medium. Here are
some types of attackers that are being seen in the VANET, who can potentially alter the
network can have a hazardous effect on the road environment [19].
• Insider: This type of attacker can be considered as an authentic user of the network
and have detail-specific knowledge of the network. Insider attacker has access to insider
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knowledge, which is used to understand the design and configuration of the network. When
they have all the required information about the system design, then it is easy for them
to launch attacks and create a more severe problem as compared to outsider attackers. It
can also create problems in the network by changing the encryption keys. In VANET, the
insider attackers enter into the network and send some wrong messages. This can result in
system jamming and accidents. This type of attack may be detected by using model-based
consistency checking.
• Outsider: The outsider attacker is not considered an authentic user of the network.
It is considered a kind of intruder whose primary aim is to misuse the established network
protocols, and the range of such attacks is limited. Outsider attacker also has a limited
diversity for launching different kinds of attacks as compared to insider attackers.
• Vandal: This type of attacker is part of the network, and the primary aim of this
attacker is to showcase their abilities to attack the established network.
• Malicious Hacker: The malicious hacker is the type of attacker who is directly
involved with the running system, and the primary aim of targeting the system is to have
a personal gain or shared profit.
• Rational Hacker: The rational hacker is the type of attacker who majorly predicts
the personal assistance from the invasion. Due to this, we can say that, unlike the malicious
hacker, the rational hacker attacks are more certain and based on a set pattern.

2.2.3

Position Falsification Attack

VANET can be considered as one of the significant advancements in the field of autonomous
vehicles. VANET supports a lot of types of applications in the field of autonomous vehicles. The two major types of applications supported in VANET are the safety application
and the Non-safety applications. The non-safety applications are further divided into two
types comfort applications and the traffic information system. Comfort applications are the
applications that are related to the convenience of the user present in the network. The
services available in the comfort application are mainly weather forecast updates or can be
the shortest route to the desired destination. In distinction to the non-safety application,
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the safety application mainly deals with the driver’s safety present in the network. The
safety application is further divided into two types: situation awareness and warning application. The situation awareness application deals with the driver’s awareness, as seen in
the blind spot warning to the driver or the adaptive cruise control. The warning message
is event-driven and generates ”alerts” for the driver.

Figure 2.3: An example of Position Falsification attack [29]

Vehicles that are part of the network transmit their available status to the nearby present
nodes in the road network. All the available nodes in the transmitter vehicle’s range will
receive a BSM (Basic Safety Message). As part of the thumb rule, these safety messages
are being transmitted at a constant period in the network. BSMs, which are being sent to
the receiver by the transmitter, are first digitally signed by the transmitter and contain the
vehicle’s information such as its current position, speed, direction and other information.
Cryptographic techniques are used to sign the BSM contents digitally. Malicious vehicles
send the false position of the vehicles in the form of BSM that mislead the legitimate vehicles
in the network. An incorrect position can also be inserted if the GPS is not working correctly
[38]. The attack generated by false position information present within the BSMs is known
as the Position falsification attack, as depicted in Figure 2.3. A position falsification attack
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violates the data integrity requirement for secure communication.
Position falsification attacks cannot be detected using cryptographic methods only, as
they may originate from vehicles with valid credentials. So, additional mechanisms are
needed to detect false data and ensure message correctness in the BSM.

2.3
2.3.1

Overview of Machine Learning and Deep Learning
Machine Learning

Machine learning is one of the prominent fields of Artificial Intelligence that facilitates machines to execute specific jobs faster and skillfully using statistical learning. These days,
machine learning and deep learning, which is part of machine learning, is being rigorously
used in several fields out of which the major industries that use them are e-commerce and
spam detection email system. Machine learning algorithms discover patterns in input data
to make predictions, detect or categorize data, and solve real-world problems. In the field of
VANET, machine learning algorithms can detect attacks and misbehaviour in the network.
There are four main types of machine learning [6]:
• Supervised Learning: In supervised machine learning, the algorithm is trained on the
labelled data. Supervised learning helps to solve two types of problems: classification and
regression.
• Unsupervised Learning: In unsupervised learning, the algorithm is trained on the unlabelled data and using that, a pattern is being detected. This type of learning is primarily
used for organizing data present in the clusters and association learning.
• Semi-supervised Learning: From the start, the data is being mixed with both labelled
and unlabelled data; it gives an advantage of both supervised and unsupervised learning.
• Reinforcement learning: It features an algorithm that improves upon itself and learns
from new situations using a trial-and-error method. Favourable outputs are encouraged
or ‘reinforced,’ and non-favourable outputs are discouraged or ‘punished.’ Based on the
concept of conditioning, reinforcement learning works by using the algorithm in a work
environment using an interpreter and a reward-based system.
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Deep Learning

Deep learning is a subpart of machine learning that deals with algorithms inspired by the
brain’s structures called artificial neural networks. Deep learning mirrors the functioning
of our brains. Deep learning algorithms are pretty similar to how the nervous system is
structured, where each neuron is connected and passing information. Deep learning models
work in multiple layers, and a general model has at least three layers. Each layer accepts
some information from the previous and passes it on to the next one. Types of Deep learning are [5] :

1) Feedforward neural network This type of deep learning neural network is a simple
neural network where the flow occurs from the base input layer and the secondary output
layer. These kinds of networks are only having single layers or only one hidden layer. Since
the data moves only in 1 direction, there is no backpropagation technique in this network.
In this network, the sum of the weights present in the input is fed into the input layer.
These kinds of networks are used in the facial recognition algorithm using computer vision.

2) Multi-layer perceptron This type of network has more than three layers used to
classify the data, which is not linear form. These types of networks are fully connected with
every node. These networks are extensively used for speech recognition and other machine
learning technologies.

3) Convolution neural network (CNN) CNN is one of the variations of the multilayer perceptron. CNN can contain more than one convolution layer, and since it contains
a convolution layer, the network is very deep with fewer parameters. CNN is very effective
for image recognition and identifying different image patterns.

4) Recurrent neural network (RNN) is a type of neural network where the output
of a particular neuron is fed back as an input to the same node. This method helps the
network to predict the output. This kind of network helps maintain a slight state of memory
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which is very useful for developing the chatbot. This kind of network is used in chatbot
development and text-to-speech technologies.

2.3.3

Basic Machine Learning and Deep Learning Terminologies

Basic terminologies and concepts of machine learning and deep learning used in the thesis
are discussed below:
Model: A model is defined as the machine or deep learning algorithm used to solve the
problem statement.
Dataset: Input data that is being used to train the model is known as a dataset.
Feature Selection: Features are nothing but the data objects in the dataset with essential
characteristics to solve the problem.
Data Pre-Processing: Any raw dataset has much redundancy because of duplicates and
noise present in the data. Due to this, it is pretty difficult to process the data and train the
model leading to lower accuracy of results.
Cross-Validation: In this particular type of training and testing approach, the data is
randomly split into groups. Of each group, there is train and test data, and the calculated
average is the model performance. It is quite an effective technique to avoid overfitting.
Activation functions: These are the functions that majorly make the decision, given the
inputs into the node because it is the activation function that decides the actual output;
we often refer to the outputs of a layer as its ”activations.”
Weights: When an input data is passed to a neuron, it automatically gets multiplied by
that value.
Bias: This is one of the learnable parameters of the neural network like weights.

2.3.4

Classification Algorithm

It is a subclass of supervised machine learning. Where we use labelled datasets as the input
data, algorithms used to solve the classification problems are known as classifiers. In the
VANET, the machine and deep learning can classify the legitimate and attacker nodes [22].
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Binary Classification: Binary classification means there are two classes to work with
that relate to one another as true and false.
Multi-Class Classification: Unlike binary classification, the multi-class classification
does not have the notion of normal and abnormal outcomes. Instead, examples are classified
as belonging to one among a range of available classes. The number of class labels may be
vast on some problems.

Binary Classification Algorithms:
Naive Bayes: Naive Bayes is a machine learning model used for large volumes of data;
if you are working with data with millions of data records, the recommended approach is
Naive Bayes. It gives excellent results when it comes to Natural Language Processing tasks
such as sentiment analysis. It is quite a fast classification algorithm. It is a type of classifier
that works quite well with the Bayes theorem. Membership probabilities are predicted for
every class, such as the probability of data points associated with a particular class. The
class which has the maximum amount of probability is appreciated as the most suitable
scenario. This is also referred to as Maximum A Posteriori (MAP).
Logistic Regression: Logistic regression is one of the most common machine learning
algorithms used for binary classification. It majorly predicts the probability depending on
the occurrence of a binary (0 and 1) outcome using a logit function. The logit function
is the natural log of the odds that represents Y equals one of the primary categories. If
we assume Y has only two categories and code them as 0 and 1, it is a particular case of
linear regression as it predicts the outcome probabilities using log function. The activation
function (sigmoid) can be used to convert the outcome into a categorical value.
Support Vector Machines: A support vector machine is a machine learning model
that can generalize between two different classes if the set of labelled data is provided in
the training set to the algorithm. The primary function of the SVM can check for the
hyperplane, which then distinguishes between the two classes.
There can be many hyperplanes that can do this task, but the objective is to find that
hyperplane that has the highest margin that means maximum distances between the two
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classes, so that in future, if a new data point comes that is two be classified, then it can be
classified easily.
K-Nearest Neighbour: KNN is being used for both classification and regression predictive problems. However, it is mainly used in classification problems in the industry. The
K-Nearest Neighbour algorithm assumes that similar items are present within proximity.
In simple words, similar things are within proximity to each other. KNN is implemented by
finding the distance between all the data points and a query point and selecting k nearest
neighbours. Based on the available labels of k nearest neighbours, it then chooses the label
emphasized on popularity. This label is assigned to the query point by the maximum vote
of the neighbours [32].
Deep Learning Algorithms:

Multi-Layer Perceptron: Multi layer perceptron (MLP) is a type of feed forward neural
network. It consists of three types of layers which are the input layer, output layer and
hidden layer, as shown in Fig. 2.4 . The input layer receives the input signal that is needed
to be processed. The required task as prediction and classification is done by the output
layer. An arbitrary number of hidden layers that are placed between the input and output
layer are the true algorithm engine of the MLP. [25] The purpose of the hidden layers is to
increase the learning of model in order to increase the accuracy of the results.
Quite similar to a type of feed-forward type of network, in a MLP the flow of data is in
the forward direction from the input to the output layer. The neurons present in the Multi
layer perceptron are trained and tested with the backpropagation of learning algorithm.
MLPs are designed in such a way so that they can approximate any continuous function
present and is able to solve problems that are not linearly separable. The primary use cases
of MLP are in pattern classification, recognition, prediction and approximation.

2.4

VeReMi Dataset

VANET is been deployed on the road side, where vehicles have mobile nodes. Active security
and intelligent transportation are important applications of VANET, which need suitable
vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology, especially routing technology. Heijden et al.
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Figure 2.4: Multi-Layer Perceptron [25]

[35] introduced the first public extensible dataset, namely Vehicular Reference Misbehavior
Dataset (VeReMi). VeReMi is a simulated dataset, generated using LuST (Version 2) and
VEINS (with modifications, based on Version 4.6). It consists of message logs per vehicle,
containing both GPS data (labelled as type=2) about the local vehicle and BSM messages
(labelled as type=3) received from other vehicles through DSRC. It has two primary purposes: it serves as a baseline to assess how misbehaviour detection mechanisms operate on
a city scale, and it saves you a lot of computational power typically required to run VEINS
sufficiently often. VeReMi consists of three different density levels, five different attacks,
and three different attacker densities [35]. The code and configuration files that are the
input of VEINS are available in a separate repository on the securecomm2018 branch
Simulation Parameter

Value

Description

Duration
Vehicle Density
Attacker Density

100s
(3,5,7)h
0.1,0.2,0.3

Total Duration of Simulation
3:low Density, 5 Medium Density, 7 High Density
10, 20 and 30 percent attacker density

Table 2.1: Simulation Parameter of VeReMi dataset

Each simulation log contains a ground truth file for every message and a set of message
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logs for every vehicle that received messages. The filename of a message log identifies
the receiver by vehicle number and OMNeT++ module number, e.g., JSONlog-0-7-A0.json
refers to the 0th vehicle with OMNeT++ module ID 7. The latter is the number also used
to identify the sender as such in any reception log and the ground truth file. A0 refers to
the fact that this vehicle is not an attacker.
The VeReMi dataset includes five different types of osition falsification attacks, as discussed below:
1. Constant attack: In this type of attack, the attacker vehicle continuously broadcasts fixed position coordinates in the BSM. This attack could misguide genuine vehicles
into thinking of it as congestion ahead on the road.
2. Constant offset Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker vehicle adds a fixed offset/fixed value to the genuine position and transmits the network’s altered position. This
attack is quite hard to detect as the attacker seems to be behaving generally by slightly
manipulating the genuine position in the BSM.
3. Random Position Attack: In the random position attack, the attacker transmits any
randomized position using the simulation area of the network. It creates severe chaos in the
network as every consecutive BSM will have an entirely new, different and random value
from the simulation.
4. Random Offset Position Attack: In this particular type of attack, the attackers
transmit any random value from a pre-defined area around their vehicle. This attack seems
quite similar to a constant offset attack as both attacks slightly manipulate the position
information.
5. Eventual Stop Attack: In the eventual stop attack, the attacker tries to behave normally for some sample amount of time in the network and once the attacker gains the trust,
then suddenly transmits a fixed position repeatedly to act as an eventual stopping of the
vehicle. This type of attack can misguide the legitimate vehicles by gaining trust in the
network for some time and then deceive them.

The attack types descriptions, along with examples, are summarized the Table 2.2
A part of these vehicles is malicious, which is virtually created using a uniform distri-
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Attack Types in VeReMi Dataset
Attack Name
Description
Constant
Vehicle transmits
a fixed position.
Constant Offset
Offset added to
vehicle’s
actual
position
Random
Transmits
random
position
from simulation
area.
Random Offset
Random position
from preconfigured rectangular
area around the
vehicle.
Evetual Stop
Attacker behaves
normally
for
some time and
then
transmits
current position
repeatedly.
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Example
x=5560, y=5820
x = 250,y = 150

Random in Simulation area.

x,y uniformly random from [300,
300]

Stop probability
+ = 0.025 with
each position update

Table 2.2: Summary of Attack Types in VeReMi

bution measure. Then these attacker vehicles send wrong position coordinates in the form
of BSMs. Message log files will record the altered position sent by an attacker vehicle, but
the ground truth file, which is the primary file for the transmission, maintains the vehicle’s
original position coordinate. A vehicle can also receive zero BSMs if it does not move closer
to another vehicle present in the network.
Attacker type value helps to determine between genuine vehicles and attacker vehicles.
By default, the attacker type for genuine vehicles is set to 0, while it is 1,2,4,8,16 are set
for different attacks, as shown in Table 2.2. VeReMi dataset is generated on a large traffic
scenario, including many highways, prime city and street regions. In this research, the
VeReMi dataset provides a standard dataset which is the Single BSM dataset is further
extended into two consecutive BSM datasets for misbehaviour classification of five different
position falsification attacks.
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Literature Review

Machine learning is the desired method these days for misbehaviour detection in VANET.
Cryptographic frameworks majorly named the PKI model primarily authenticate the vehicle’s identity in the network but do not ensure message authenticity. An add-on model such
as machine learning or deep learning can enhance message legitimacy. Machine learning
or Deep learning helps to identify the features of a highly volatile vehicular network. It is
quite a data-centric approach to maximize network performance by reducing the number
of vulnerabilities present in the network. Some of the machine learning or deep learning
approaches are explained in this section. Comparative analysis of the literature review is
given in Table 2.3
Table 2.3: Position Falsification Detection Schemes
No. Paper

5

Machine and Deep Learning VeReMi dataset used
Algorithm Used
Heijden et al [35] . No
Yes
Steven So et al [31]. SVM
No
Sohan Gyawali et al Random Forest
Yes
[8].
Mayank Dave et al Random Forest
Yes
[15].
J Grover et al [7]. Naive Bayes
Yes

Approach Used

1
2
3

6

P Singh et al [30]. SVM

Yes

7

J Kamel et al [13]. SVM

Yes

8

J Montenegro et al KNN
[20].
A Sharma et al KNN
[27].
Propsed Method
MLP

Yes

Belief theory Approach
Plausability Checks
Sender Receiver Approach
Ensemble Method Approach is used
Ensemble Method Approach is used
Normalizing the position
matrix
By predicting New Position
By trust based model

Yes

Vehicle RSU Approach

Yes

Deep
Learning
Approach in Vehicle RSU

4

9
10

2.5.1

Misbehabiour Detection In VANET

In paper [35], the authors introduced a framework which is called Maat, which mainly
ensures the validity of received data transmitted by the sender. Maat is a type of framework based on subjective logic - which can be understood as a mathematical framework
that enables unpredictability through objects known as subjective opinions on data. Subjective opinions can be considered as a relationship between actors and objects that can
express their confidence with a degree of unpredictability. It is based on belief theory
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similar to Dempster-Shafer’s theory. Maat uses this information to generate a fusion and
data management system to determine the confidence of data. Maat uses a directed graph.
The authors used four comparison checks for performance evaluation of the model, namely
Acceptance Range Threshold (ART), Sudden Appearance Warning (SAW), Simple Speed
Check (SSC), and Distance Moved Verifier (DMV).

In paper [31] the authors proposed integrating plausibility checks and a machine learning framework for misbehaviour detection using the sender-receiver pair approach in the
VeReMi dataset. In the paper approach, they added features: numbering from 1-6, using
the two checks it become capable of identifying the wrong location and the remaining four
checks are being used for quantitative information that is being used to detail vehicle’s
behaviour present in the network. The two major plausibility checks that authors include
are movement plausibility checks and location.

In recent research by Gyawali et al. [8], they introduced a misbehaviour detection model for
both false alert verification schemes and position falsification attacks. This available framework is also dependent on the sender-receiver approach. A fake alert is generated when the
attacker transmits a wrong alert to the in-range vehicles part of the network. These alerts
primarily include hazard condition notification, vehicle stopping warnings. In the proposed
paper framework, the authors equipped each vehicle with a misbehaviour detection model..

In paper [15], which assumes a linear speed-density relationship to estimate uninterrupted
traffic. The receiver vehicle calculates the change in its speed, position and difference in
sender vehicles speed, position, receiving distance and RSSI value

In paper [7], a machine learning approach is being used to classify multiple misbehaviours
in VANET using concrete and behavioural features of each node that sends safety packets.
A security framework is designed to differentiate a malicious node from a legitimate node.
Various types of misbehaviours occur in VANET by tampering with information present
in the propagated packet. These misbehaviours are classified based upon multifarious features like speed-deviation of node, received signal strength (RSS), several packets delivered,
dropped packets etc. Two types of classification accuracies are measured: Binary and Multi-
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Class. In Binary classification, all types of misbehaviours are considered to be in a single
“misbehaviour” class whereas, Multi-class classification can categorize misbehaviours into
particular misbehaving classes.

In paper [30] the goal is to analyze safety messages and detect false position information
transmitted by the misbehaving nodes. In this paper, machine learning (ML) techniques on
VeReMi dataset to detect misbehaviour are being used. Demonstrated that the ML-based
approach enables high-quality detection of modelled attack patterns.

In paper [13] proposed a machine learning algorithm that tries to predict the next available
position of the vehicle present in the network. The authors here use beacon messages as
BSM’s from neighbouring nodes and create features such as paths between transmitter and
receiver. ML algorithms were used for the training and testing of the model. The paper
compares the calculated value with the actual value in the BSM and classifies the vehicles
based on the comparison done on the actual and predicted values. If the position is not the
same as prediction, it is then classified as an attacker vehicle. The authors claimed that
Random Forest performs best among other algorithms.

In paper [20], the proposed method aims to evaluate parameters used for the computation of
trust metrics applying machine learning techniques. Results show the superior discriminative power of the receiver power coherency metric when detecting misbehaving nodes based
on fake position attacks. The approach has a data-oriented model, which defines direct
trust and the trust metric that is being calculated depends on the transmitted message’s
data. The values used for the trust computation are provided by hello messages, also known
as beacon messages, which are periodically exchanged by the nodes of the network. The the
position and the received power coherency is a useful metric to detect misbehaving nodes
in VANETs, i.e., vehicles that announce a fake position in their hello messages.

The paper [27], proposes a novel and efficient data-centric approach to detect location
spoofing using machine learning algorithms. Presented a novel ML-based approach for
detecting position falsification attacks in VANET. Unlike existing techniques considering
individual BSMs, the model uses pairs of consecutive BSMs from vehicles to create an aug-
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mented dataset. The augmented dataset combines selected features from the individual
BSMs and trains the different ML algorithms. Comparison between approaches with four
different algorithms and found KNN and Random Forest classifiers yield the best results.
Then compared the results of our approach (using KNN) with other recent techniques available in the literature, using the same VeReMi dataset.

In this research, the proposed methodology uses the vehicle-RSU pair approach for position falsification detection. Deep learning and Machine Learning algorithms are used to
classify legitimate vehicles and attacker vehicles.

Chapter 3

Single And Consecutive BSM
based classification
3.1

Introduction

Misbehaviour detection is a class of VANET that deals with the identification of attacks
on VANET using various methods. In my research, I’m targeting to detect the position
falsification attack in VANET using Deep Learning Techniques. The basic idea is that in
an autonomous vehicle environment, the vehicle transmits BSMs into the network, and all
the nearby vehicles and infrastructures can receive these BSMs. The BSM’s provide us with
the position, speed, heading and other relevant parameters of the sending vehicles. BSM’s
data is used to identify the behaviours of an attacker vehicle. VeReMi dataset is a collection
of the BSMs which is being used for the detection of misbehaving vehicles. The proposed
methodology aims at:
1) Providing machine learning and deep learning models to correctly identify position falsification attacks.
2)Comparing single and two Consecutive BSM’s based approaches using the deep learning
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Proposed Architecture

The security of BSMs is ensured by the cryptographic techniques using encryption and
decryption. The encryption technique works on the concept of the public and private keys.
The user digitally signs the messages before sending them to the network. The generic
approach tends to work as all the registered vehicles in the network send BSM to the other
vehicles present in the network. The major drawback of this approach is that it cannot
protect against insider attacks from vehicles with valid credentials. The reason that it’s
not able to detect the attacker vehicle is because the vehicle is part of the network and as
per the generic technique the vehicle which has the valid credentials is considered to be the
legitimate vehicle.

Figure 3.1: Proposed Architecture [26]

The proposed approach is an addition of security to the present cryptographic techniques. Vehicles in the network send BSMs, which are received by the RSU and other
nodes in the VANET. The received BSMs in the network are then updated in the shared
database. The update in the database is done using the transmit time of BSM as shown
in Fig 3.1. After receiving the BSM at the RSU, the RSU verifies the correctness of the
BSM. The proposed detection framework installed at the RSU retrieves the latest received
BSM from the vehicle from the shared database using a unique sender ID assigned to each
vehicle during registration. The proposed model creates two types of databases using the
single and two consecutive received BSMs. Using the machine and deep learning model, the
classification is being done of legitimate and attacker vehicles. Once the vehicle is identified
as an attacker or genuine, the RSU shares the information with other RSUs and vehicles
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present in the network.

3.3

Outline of Proposed Approach

The proposed methodology majorly depends on the three steps of data extraction, data
preparation and classification model. The detailed explanation of the three steps are as
follows:

3.3.1

Data Extraction

VeReMi dataset is a collection of VANET simulation of 225 indexes divided on the basis
of the different traffic densities and different attacker densities. Of all those indexes, each
index file has two types of files. The first one is the ground truth file which is the main
file that has all the required information regarding the genuine and attacker vehicles. The
ground truth file can be understood as the actual behaviour file of the network. The second
type of file present in the indexes is the log file. There is only one ground truth file in each
index, and there are multiple log files in the index as log files are the acknowledgement of
the received BSMs in the network.

Figure 3.2: Data Preparation
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Ground truth files and log files must be combined to generate a labelled dataset on
which the model can be built as per Fig 3.3. In the data extraction stage, the ground truth
file is mapped to log files for each simulation. For a single simulation, the number of log
files is equal to the number of receivers; hence the first step is to combine these separate log
files into a single file. Ground truth files and log files contain a unique id named messageID.
To create a labelled dataset, the ground truth file’s attacker type must be mapped to data
in the combined log file.

Figure 3.3: Generation of the Labelled Dataset

3.3.2

Data Preparation

Once the data was successfully extracted, then the merged data is then pre-processed. The
central part of pre-processing is combining data and removing the redundancy in the data.
As each vehicle has a separate log file, a single BSM was recorded in multiple vehicles,
creating duplicates in the dataset. The need to remove redundancy from the dataset is to
have a good model and avoid overfitting the model. After the redundancy, the central part
was to remove the non-contributing factors. This was the part where the model needs to
learn which factors contribute more and which contribute less. The reason to remove the
non-contributing element it can affect the accuracy of the model to a great extent.

As per Fig 3.4, the position and speed are the factors playing a significant role in the
model compared to the other features. The primary use of the features is to tell which
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Figure 3.4: Contributing Factors

vehicle is not behaving accurately in the network. With the single BSM, the information
available to detect misbehaviour is much less compared to the 2 BSM model. The significant
factors, as discussed above, are speed and position, which play a vital role in both BSMs
models. Many of the other non-contributing features have been removed to increase the
learning of the model. Some of the non-contributing features of the dataset are sender id,
receiver id and position noise vector.
Table 3.1 shows an example of the items of the dataset, when using features from a
single BSM.
Vehicle No.
1
2
3

pos.0
5409.774101
4432.548015
6224.82792

pos.1
5794.384047
5295.893829
6021.888413

pos.2
1.895
1.895
1.895

spd.0
-11.81679849
3.756319888
-15.28586521

spd.1
-3.873118663
-30.33504372
5.422040364

message id
973
1222
1857

Table 3.1: Example of Single BSM Dataset

When using two consecutive BSMs, the features include x and y coordinates of position
and speed for both BSM1 and BSM2. An example of a two-consecutive BSM dataset is
shown in Table 4.2:
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pos.X1
3588.8
3590.48
3592.70

pos.Y1
5912.4
5942.29
5972.12

spd.X1
1.277
2.228
2.224

spd.Y1
30.02
29.93
29.87

Pos X2
3590.48
3592.70
3594.92

Pos Y2
5942.29
5972.12
6001.93

Spd X2
2.22
2.22
2.22
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Spd Y2
29.93
29.87
29.90

Table 3.2: Example of Consecutive BSM Dataset

3.3.3

Classification

The third and final stage of the proposed model is the classification of the dataset. In
this thesis, we will implement both types of classification using machine learning and deep
learning models. The machine learning binary classification is performed on separate attacks, and all five position falsification attacks are combined in a single BSM dataset and
two consecutive BSM datasets. The machine learning algorithm used for classification is KNearest Neighbours, and the Deep Learning algorithm used for classification is Multi-Layer
Perceptron. Classifiers give a better correct classification rate out of the machine, and deep
algorithms will be used in a detection framework. The correct classification rate depends on
the performance metrics, which are explained in detail in section 4.1.4. These algorithms
train the model using a training set and classify the future data as legitimate or attacker.

Figure 3.5: Multi-Layer Perceptron
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The major part of the classification is using deep learning, for that, Multi-Layer Perceptron is being used. The MLP is a type of feedforward artificial neural network (ANN).
For our classification model, we used two hidden layers for the neural network; in the first
hidden layer, we used five neurons. The reason to use five neurons for the first hidden layer
is that it is recommended that the number of neurons should be less than the number of
features [10]. As the features used for the model were six, so the first layer had five neurons.
The second hidden layer has two neurons. The second layer plays a crucial role in the output
generated. As the output of the model is binary, classifying a vehicle legitimate or attacker,
thus the second hidden layer absorbs the extra features and presents the binary result of
the model. For the activation function, Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) [23] is used as the
linear function so that input yields a positive output, otherwise, it will output zero. The
reason to use it with MLP in a model is that it is easier to train and gives better results.
The MLP classifier model implemented to detect the position falsification is Limited
memory-Broyden Fletcher Goldfarb Shanno [21], which is an optimization algorithm in the
family of quasi-Newton methods and uses cross-entropy loss function [36]. This algorithm
measures the performance of a classification model whose output is a probability value
between 0 and 1. The primary purpose of the optimizer is when the model is learning by
the dataset. Once the learning is done, the model tries to predict the result of the test
data. The cross-entropy loss function decides whether the algorithm is performing correctly
by using the loss function. If the value of the loss function increases, then the optimizer
adjusts the parameters to improve accuracy.

3.3.4

Sender-RSU Based approach

Many researchers have introduced a misbehaviour detection model to detect position falsification attacks using VeReMi dataset. Some of the occurring approaches use features
of change seen in speed and position of the vehicle to train the model, some other uses
the trust-based models to detect an attack. The majority of them have worked on senderreceiver pairs to identify misbehaviour in the network.
In the sender-receiver pair approach, as many researchers do, a detection framework is
configured on the OBU in vehicles to detect misbehaviour. In this proposed methodology, a
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No.

Sender-Receiver Approach

Sender-RSU Approach

1
2
3
4

Detection Performed at OBU
Computation overhead on OBU
Sender Receiver Approach
Machine Learning Approach is used

Detection performed at RSU
No computational overhead at OBU
Sender RSU Approach
Deep Learning is Used height
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Table 3.3: Comparison of sender-receiver and sender-RSU approaches

single BSM calculation and two consecutive BSMs are considered features in a dataset. For
the proposed method, the detection framework is installed on the RSU rather than OBU,
thus reducing computational overhead on the vehicles. The proposed method alleviates the
V2V dependency in the network as RSU gives a clearer view of any misbehaviour in the
network. For sender-receiver-based approaches, the attacker’s vehicle needs to be in the
range of other legitimate vehicles to get detected. In the vehicle-RSU pair approach, the
detection of the attack can potentially be done even before it comes within the range of the
legitimate vehicles.

Chapter 4

Results
In order to avoid high infrastructure costs, facilities, and resource requirements, the experiments were performed in a virtual environment using simulation tools . This is a relatively
economical and safe way of determining the performance of algorithms. Chapter 4 has setup
discussion regarding simulation tools and parameters used in the VeReMi dataset, experimental setup toolkits, classification parameters, and evaluation metrics for measuring the
proposed classification model’s performance. Also, apart from the experimental parameters
this chapter presents the simulation results for the model and comparisons with the existing
approaches

4.1
4.1.1

Setup
VeReMi Dataset

The VeReMi dataset is being used in the research, which is a publicly available dataset for
VANET. The dataset is prepared by using three tools which are SUMO, VEINS and OMNET++. SUMO (Simulation Of Urban Mobility) is being used to produce traffic density
present in the network. The Vehicular Reference Misbehavior (VeReMi) dataset evaluates
misbehaviour detection mechanisms for VANETs (vehicular networks). This dataset consists of message logs of onboard units, including a labelled ground truth file, generated
from a simulation environment, the simulation parameters used to generate the dataset are
32
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shown in Table 4.1. The dataset includes malicious messages intended to trigger incorrect
application behaviour, which misbehaviour detection mechanisms aim to detect. The initial
dataset contains several simple attacks: the idea of this dataset release is to provide a baseline for comparing detection mechanisms and serve as a starting point for more complex
attacks. [12] :
Parameter
Mobility
Simulation Start
Simulation Duration
Attacker Probability
Simulation Area
Signal Interfernce Model
Obstacle Shadowing
Fading
Shadowing
MAC implementation
Thermal Noise
Transmit Power
Bit Rate
Sensitivity
Antenna Model
Beaconing Rate

Values
SUMO Lust
(3,5,7) Vehicle Density
100s
(0.1,0.2,0.3) Attacker Density
2300,5400,6300 Types of road
Two Ray Interference
Simple
Jakes
Log-Normal
802.11p
-110dbm
20mV
6Mbps
-89dbm
Monopole on Roof
1Hz
Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters [12]

4.1.2

Attacks Implementation

The attackers we consider are of 5 types: the constant attacker, the random attacker,
the constant offset attacker, the random offset attacker, and the eventual stop attacker.
The regular attacker transmits a fixed, preconfigured position; the constant offset attacker
transmits a fixed, preconfigured offset added to their actual position; the random attacker
sends a random position from the simulation area; the random offset attacker sends an
arbitrary position in a preconfigured rectangle around the vehicle; the eventual stop attacker
generally behaves for some time, and then attacks by transmitting the current position
repeatedly that is if it has stopped. The random attacks (4 and 8) take a new random
sample for every message. The 5 attackers with their respective attack paramters are shown
in Fig. 4.1
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Figure 4.1: Attack Parameters [12]

The available VeReMi dataset contains 225 indexes simulation, split into three types of
density categories that can be further classified. The low-density Vehicles have 35 to 39
vehicles. In comparison, the medium density contains between 97 and 108 vehicles, and the
high-density vehicles include between 491 and 519 vehicles. Out of these available vehicles, a
part of the dataset includes malicious vehicles. The required decision is made by sampling a
uniform distribution ([0, 1]) and comparing it to the attacker fraction parameter, essentially
assigning each vehicle to be an attacker with that probability.

4.1.3

Dataset Analysis and Classification Parameters

In this research, four different traffic scenarios are combined to create four datasets, as
shown in Table. 4.2. A combination of low, medium, high and merged attacker and vehicle
densities are combined to evaluate the proposed model in all four cases. In the current
research, we will refer to the above-mentioned dataset combinations as low, medium, high
and merged-density datasets. All the attacks are evaluated in low, medium, high, and
merged density to measure the impact of vehicle and attacker density on the proposed
model’s performance. An individual simulation in the VeReMi dataset contains multiple
JSON log files, which are combined into one single log file, and the “Attacker type” label
present in the Ground truth file is combined with the log file to generate a labelled dataset.
This process is repeated for all five repetitions. Extraction of data is done by downloading
the simulation scenarios and generating mapped data from these files.
Pre-processing the data is done by filtering out non-contributing features and removing
duplicate data is implemented using a Python script. After generating a clean, pre-processed
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1
2
3
4
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Attack Types
1,2,4,8,16
1,2,4,8,16
1,2,4,8,16
1,2,4,8,16

Vehicle Density
LOW(3)
MEDIUM(5)
HIGH(7)
MERGED(3,5,7)

Attacker Density
LOW(0.1)
MEDIUM(0.2)
HIGH(0.3)
MERGED(0.1,0.2,0.3)

Repetition
0 to 4
0 to 4
0 to 4
0 to 4

Table 4.2: Example of Consecutive BSM Dataset

two-consecutive and Single BSM datasets are generated on which , we perform classification.
The classification includes the following:
Model Used A model is being used to perform classification. There are different
algorithms for classification, as discussed in section 2.3.4. In this research, two types of
learning are being used i) a standard classification algorithm, viz., K Nearest Neighbour,
and ii) a Deep Learning algorithm, viz., Multi-Layer Perceptron.
Cross-validation Cross-validation is a type of re-sampling procedure that is being used
to evaluate machine or deep learning models on a limited data set. The procedure contains
a single parameter called k that refers to the number of groups that a given data sample
is split into. As such, the procedure is often defined k-fold cross-validation [2], when a
specific value for k is chosen. In the proposed model, k=100 is used, which creates 100-fold
cross-validation. Cross-validation is used in applied machine or deep learning to estimate
the skill of a machine or deep learning model on unseen data.

4.1.4

Evaluation Metrics

The VeReMi dataset contains both the types of vehicles, the attacker and the legitimate
vehicles. The primary thing is that though the dataset has two kinds of distribution,
the dataset is imbalanced. Due to imbalanced data, the accuracy can’t be considered the
optimal way to determine the performance of the model. To assess the correctness of the
imbalanced data apart from the accuracy, the precision, recall and F1 score are determined
using the confusion matrix. The confusion matrix can be understood as the table showing
the correct and incorrect prediction in tabular form as shown in Fig 4.2.

Precision The model precision score represents the model’s ability to correctly predict

Chapter 4. Results

36

Figure 4.2: Confusion Matrix

the positives out of all the positive predictions it made. The precision score is a valuable
measure of success of prediction when the classes are very imbalanced [37]. Mathematically,
it presents the ratio of true positive to the sum of true positive and false positive.

P recision =

T rueP ositive
T rueP ositive
=
T rueP ositive + F alseP ositive
T otalP redictedP ositive

Recall Model recall score represents the model’s ability to accurately predict the positives out of actual positives. This is unlike precision which measures how many predictions
made by models are positive out of all positive predictions made [3].

Recall =

T rueP ositive
T rueP ositive
=
T rueP ositive + F alseN egative
T otalActualP ositive

F1-Score Model F1 score presents the model score as a function of precision and recalls
score. F1 - score is a machine learning model performance metric that gives equal weight to
both the Precision and Recalls for measuring the performance in terms of accuracy, making
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it a better alternative to Accuracy metrics (it doesn’t require us to know the total number
of observations) [16].

F 1 = 2X

4.1.5

P recision ∗ Recall
P recision + Recall

Environment and Tools used

All the simulations conducted for this research were conducted in the following environment
and configuration:

• Operating system: MacBook Air - macOS Big Sur • Processor: 2.3 GHz Quad-Core
Intel Core i5
• Memory: 8 GB
Tools and libraries used for the implementation of this research are: • Programming language: Python 3.7
• Integrated Development Environment: Visual Studio Code
• Libraries: Scikit-learn, matplotlib, NumPy, pandas

4.2

Classification Results for Two Consecutive BSM

In this section, we implemented the algorithms on the two consecutive BSM dataset created using the VeReMi dataset. The machine learning algorithm used is the K Nearest
Neighbour, and the deep learning algorithm used is the Multi-Layer Perceptron on each of
the attack types, and the tables below represent the precision, recall and F1 score of the
algorithms on two BSM’ data.
Attack - 1 : The reason that both the algorithms show such promising results for attack
type 1 is because a vehicle constantly transmits a fixed location but not a fixed velocity,
making it easily observable which makes the learning easy for the model which can be seen
in all the four tables.
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Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
95

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
98.9
99

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
97.2
98.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
96.7
97.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
100
93
Attack -4
Recall
99.2
99.2
Attack -8
Recall
98.1
98.5
Attack -16
Recall
94.2
98.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
100
94.6
F1-Score
98.9
99.1
F1-Score
98.3
98.6
F1-Score
94.7
97.5

Table 4.3: Classification results of Consecutive BSM model-LOW

Attack 2 : In this, two consecutive BSM are created as features in the model, making
machine and deep learning algorithms able to detect patterns and recognize this attack
type as this deals with the constant offset which is relatively easy for the model to learn.
KNN algorithms performed exceptionally well as compared to MLP as there attack 2 is a
constant offset attack, so the model learns the offset and is able to perform exceptionally
well in all the tables except for the Table 4.3 as the low dataset doesn’t have sufficient data
for the model to learn properly .
Attack 4 : In the attack type 4 the attack is detected with high precision and recall by
both the two algorithms in all four densities. In this attack, the vehicle sends the random
position from the simulation playground. With a two-consecutive BSM approach, ML and
DL models could detect the attack as there was a range gap between the two position
coordinates from a vehicle as per the Table 4.5.

Attack 8 : Similar to attack type 4, this attack transmits random positions from a fixed
area near the vehicle. Since the range distance between two positions is small, detecting
this attack is difficult. However, our proposed model performed well with Multi Layer

Chapter 4. Results

39

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
99.8
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
98.9
99

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
92.5
98.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
96.7
98.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
99.5
100
Attack -4
Recall
99.2
99.2
Attack -8
Recall
96.5
97.5
Attack -16
Recall
94.7
98.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
97.2
100
F1-Score
98.9
98.1
F1-Score
98.3
98.6
F1-Score
93.5
97.5

Table 4.4: Classification results of Consecutive model-MEDIUM

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
98.9
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
99

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
96.2
98.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
96.7
98.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
98.6
100
Attack -4
Recall
98.4
99.2
Attack -8
Recall
98.1
97.5
Attack -16
Recall
93.4
98.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
99.4
100
F1-Score
97.9
99.1
F1-Score
97.3
98.6
F1-Score
94.7
97.5

Table 4.5: Classification results of Consecutive model-HIGH
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Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
98.9
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
98.9
99

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
97.2
98.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
96.7
98.7

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
98.6
100
Attack -4
Recall
99.2
99.2
Attack -8
Recall
98.1
98.5
Attack -16
Recall
94.2
99.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
99.4
100
F1-Score
94.7
99.1
F1-Score
98.3
98.6
F1-Score
94.7
98.5

Table 4.6: Classification results of Consecutive model-MERGED

Perceptron classifiers in low and medium density as per Tables 4.4 , 4.3.
Attack 16 : In this attack, the attacker acts typically for a brief period of time before
repeatedly transmitting the exact location in the BSMs. As per the Table 4.6 The model
showed no improvement in performance with an increase in the data density. One reason
may be that the vehicle is labelled as an attacker even though it is acting normally, confusing
the machine learning model.

4.3

Comparison of results for Single BSM with Existing Approaches

In addition to two consecutive BSMs, both the Multi-Layer Perceptron and K-Nearest
Neighbour algorithms were tested with Single BSM approach. In this case the deep learning
model (MLP) clearly outperformed the ML algorithm (KNN).
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.10 show the performance of the two algorithms using single BSM
approach for Low, Medium and High vehicle densities respectively; while Table 4.9 shows
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Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
32.6
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
54.8
94.6

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
86.7
95.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
34.6
91.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
40.2
100
Attack -4
Recall
69.2
93.2
Attack -8
Recall
88.4
94.8
Attack -16
Recall
54.8
90.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
44.3
100
F1-Score
53.9
94.7
F1-Score
88.9
92.9
F1-Score
34.7
92.6

Table 4.7: Classification results of Single BSM Proposed model-LOW

the results for the merged dataset with different vehicle densities. For all cases the DL model
achieves consistently higher values of percision, recall and F1-score. The performance of the
DL model is somewhat lower for low vehicle densities, as it is a data-hungry model (Table
4.7), where due to the lower number of vehicles and attacks there is less opportunity for
the model to learn effectively. Still, compared to the KNN, the performance is significantly
higher.
Based on these observations, we conclude the the DL model can achieve high quality
results, even with the simpler single BSM approach; whereas, the performance of the ML
model is quite poor in this case. To achieve acceptable results using ML model, it is
necessary to use the consecutive BSM approach, which increases the complexity of the
algorithm needed to create the items in the dataset. This is because in consecutive BSM
approach, the previous BSMs must be stored and retrieved in real time, which is not required
for the single BSM approach.
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Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
46.7
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
95.8
99.8

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
87.4
97.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
38.8
97.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
40.2
100
Attack -4
Recall
79.2
99.5
Attack -8
Recall
88.6
98.6
Attack -16
Recall
43.6
98.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
44.7
100
F1-Score
52.50
99.3
F1-Score
89.8
98.6
F1-Score
45.4
97.5

Table 4.8: Classification results of Single BSM Proposed model-MEDIUM

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
35.7
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
88.9
99.3

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
87.4
97.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
27.8
98.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
40.2
100
Attack -4
Recall
69.2
98.2
Attack -8
Recall
88.6
98.9
Attack -16
Recall
56.9
99.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
45.6
100
F1-Score
62.5
97.3
F1-Score
89.8
98.1
F1-Score
45.7
96.5

Table 4.9: Classification results of Single BSM Proposed model-HIGH
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Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
100
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
35.7
100

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
95.9
99.6

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
87.4
98.7

Algorithm
K-Nearest Neighbour
Multi-Layer Perceptron

Precision
27.8
97.3

Attack -1
Recall
100
100
Attack -2
Recall
40.2
100
Attack -4
Recall
49.2
99.2
Attack -8
Recall
88.6
98.5
Attack -16
Recall
54.5
98.4

F1-Score
100
100
F1-Score
45.6
100
F1-Score
62.5
99.3
F1-Score
84.8
98.6
F1-Score
40.7
97.5

Table 4.10: Classification results of Single BSM Proposed model-MERGED

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Future Work
5.1

Conclusion

This thesis proposes a novel Deep Learning-based approach for automatically detecting position falsification attacks in VANET. We have created modified datasets that consist of
selected features from the individual BSMs based on feature importance and are used to
train the proposed model using machine and deep learning algorithms. The performance of
the two classification algorithms was compared. It was found that both K-Nearest Neighbour and Multi-Layer Perceptron give excellent results when the Consecutive BSM approach
is used. But with the simpler Single BSM dataset, the MLP outperforms the KNN classifiers in yielding the best results. The proposed model is based on the notion of sender
and RSU pair approach. This approach aims to reduce the computational overhead from
vehicles (OBUs) by designing a detection model built on RSU to detect the attack and
provide a broader view for detecting the position falsification attack. It also aims to remove
the vehicle-to-vehicle dependency in the network for detecting misbehaviour.

5.2

Future Work

The VeReMi dataset, which has been used for this thesis, is limited to five specific types of
position falsification attacks and do not fully represent all the possible attacks in VANETs.
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The proposed model in this thesis is bound to only the data present in the VeReMi dataset.
For the future work of the thesis, the models can be trained to detect other types of position
falsification attacks, as well as different attacks such as DoS or replay attacks. In addition
to MLP, other Deep Learning algorithms such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) can be investigated, which may yield better results
for specific types of attacks.
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